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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CLEVE C. CHILD, EAEL L.
BOWEN, ENOCH LUDLOW and J.
LEE BUTLER,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

Case No.
13960

THE CITY OF SPANISH FORK,
a Municipal Corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action whereby the plaintiffs, owners of
certain real property located in Utah County, are seeking to compel defendant, the City of Spanish Fork, to
proceed to complete annexation of an area known as
"Wolf Hollow" without being required to comply with
a precondition thereof, namely the transfer of two
acre feet of Strawberry Valley water or its equivalent,
without cost, to Spanish Fork City for each acre of land
proposed to be annexed.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Fourth Judicial District Court, the Honorable George E. Ballif, Judge, treated defendant's mo1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. The
court ruled that there was no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law; accordingly, plaintiff's complaint was dismissed with prejudice and on the merits.
(R.7.)

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent asks the court to affirm the aforesaid
summary judgment entered by the district court.

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about June 4, 1971, and June 15, 1972, plaintiffs presented petitions to the City Council of Spanish
Fork City pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1 (1953)
requesting annexation of certain territory commonly referred to as "Wolf Hollow." (R. 9.) On or about
February 15, 1973, in a regular meeting of the said city
council, a resolution was passed approving the Wolf
Hollow annexation subject to several conditions, one of
which was the "transfer of irrigation water to the city."
(R. 9-10; 51A.) On or about April 19, 1973, the proponents of the "Wolf Hollow" annexation met again with
the city council at which time the transfer of irrigation
water was again discussed. (R. 39.) At this time the
proponents were clearly informed that before Spanish
Fork City would accept the Wolf Hollow annexation, the
landowners would be required to transfer to the city without cost, two acre feet of Strawberry Valley water or its
equivalent for each acre of land to be annexed. (R. 44.)

2
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It was further explained that this policy had been followed in the past and that they would be expected to
follow it also. (R. 44-45; 46-47.) When this matter was
heard by the district court on or about October 18, 1974,
the plaintiffs admitted noncompliance with the above
condition in that they had not transferred any irrigation
water to Spanish Fork City. (R. 10.)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY ENTERED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN RESPONDENT'S FAVOR.
Respondent respectfully submits that the instant
case is governed by this court's decision in Bradshaw
v. Beaver City, 27 Utah 2d 135, 493 P.2d 643 (1972).
In Beaver City, the court was asked to set aside an annexation ordinance passed by the city council subject to
certain conditions that the landowners had to fulfill before the annexation would be complete. City taxpayers
argued against the annexation, stating that by passing
the ordinance subject to such conditions the city council
had effectively left the ultimate determination up to
the landowners, since the landowners could refrain from
fulfilling the conditions and thus defeat the annexation.
On the basis of the pleadings and the affidavits filed
in the case, the lower court granted defendants' motion
for summary judgment and plaintiffs appealed. On appeal, this court identified the "pivotal issue" in the case
as "whether the annexation of the area in question to
3
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Beaver City constitutes an unlawful act of the city council." 493 P.2d at 644. The court then cited the trial
court with approval:
f

The court finds that even if the facts set forth in
the first cause of action were determined to be
true, it would be outside the scope of authority
of this court to make a ruling or determination on
matters that are within the discretion of the legislative authorities and mayor of Beaver City.
493 P.2d at 645.

In order to clearly define the scope of judicial review in disputed annexation cases, this court then established the following test:
The determination of the boundaries of a city
and what may or may not be encompassed therein,
including annexation or severance, is a legislative function to be performed by the governing
body of the city. The courts are and should be
reluctant to intrude into the prerogative of the
legislative branch of government, and will interfere with such action only if it plainly appears
that it is so lacking in propriety and reason that
it must be deemed capricious and arbitrary, or is
in excess of the authority of the legislative body.
493 P.2d at 645 (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted).
Respondent submits that when the instant case is
judged according to the standard applied in Beaver City,
it will be clear that summary judgment was properly
entered. In the first place, an examination of the pleadings and affidavits in the record demonstrates that no
genuine issue of material fact exists in this case. Appellants failed to plead compliance with the disputed

4
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condition of annexation in their complaint (R. 48-50; R.
40), and later asserted that compliance was immaterial.
(R. 35.) Appellants further admitted in Point V of their
memorandum that :
However, at this point, it is not material whether
the condition arose from the ordinance, from resolution, or from whatever other source. It is
instead a determination of the reasonableness of
that condition, considered in light of the evidence
and surrounding circumstances, that is being
sought by plaintiffs in their action. It is therefore only material here for this court to decide
whether or not plaintiffs' Complaint, seeking such
determination, is sufficient on its face. (R. 11;
R, 36-37.)
Thus the only question remaining for the lower court
to decide was the reasonableness of the disputed condition.
In his minute entry explaining his ruling, Judge
Ballif cited this court's decision in Beaver City as controlling the reasonableness issue. (R. 11.) He then ruled
that the condition was reasonable for the following
reasons:
The extension of municipal facilities to new territory requiring servicing by water, power, sewer,
roads, etc. would reasonably require that the legislative body provide that resources within the
projected area needed to assist in providing the
municipal facilities be transferred without compensation to the municipality if annexation is to
be allowed. To hold otherwise would make annexation a matter of right by simply meeting the
statutory requirement and could force a dilution
of municipal services, and increased tax burden
to the citizens of the municipality without allow5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ing them the right to make provision for the
servicing of additional territory. All of these considerations would lead to the conclusion that there
is no taking of private property without compensation, but the consent of a municipality to include an area only upon condition that needed
resources available such as water be given to the
municipality for the privilege of gaining such
services from the municipality. (R. 11-12.)
In Beaver City, this court stated that it will only
interfere with legislative action on annexation matters
when it plainly appears that it is either (1) capricious
and arbitrary, or (2) in excess of legislative authority.
493 P.2d at 645. As Judge Ballif's opinion demonstrates, this showing has not been made. On the contrary, it is apparent that Spanish Fork City recognized
and followed the statutory procedure for annexation as
set forth in Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1 (1953). (See R. at
40.) It is further evident that the city refused to complete the procedure only when it became evident that
the property owners were not going to comply with a
condition designed solely to provide needed resources
for the area without forcing a dilution of municipal services or an increased tax burden on resident citizens. Such
a condition falls far short of the " arbitrary and capricious" standard required before the courts will interfere in an essential legislative function. The lower court
should therefore be affirmed.

€
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POINT II
IMPOSING A REQUIREMENT
THAT
NEEDED WATER RESOURCES BE TRANSFERRED TO THE CITY AS A CONDITION
OF ANNEXATION CONSTITUTES A LEGITIMATE EXERCISE OF THE CITY'S
DELEGATED POWER TO ACT IN SUCH
MATTERS.
The issue presented by Point I of appellants' brief
is whether respondent city exceeded its statutory authority by attempting to obtain water sources for a proposed annexation other than by purchase, lease, or condemnation.
A. Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1 (1953).
The procedure for annexation of land which is contiguous to an existing boundary of a municipality is
found in Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1 (1953). Basically, the
requirements are as follows:
a. Petition for annexation by a majority of the
landowners of the land which will be included in the
annexation. This must include the owners of at least
one-third of the value of the land.
b. Preparation of a map or plat of the proposed
annexation.
c. Approval of the annexation by at least twothirds of the members of the city council.
d. Preparation and passage of an ordinance annexing the portion of land to the city.

7
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e. Recordation of both a certified copy of the annexation ordinance and the plat with the office of the
county recorder.
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized
that a determination of city boundaries is essentially a
legislative function, to be performed by the governing
body of the city or town. See Bradshaw v. Beaver City,
493 P.2d 643, discussed supra. Although the power to
initiate the formal annexation procedure rests with the
owners of contiguous land, there is a clear legislative
intent, supported by this court, that the ultimate determination is to be made by the governing body of the
municipality. This court is obviously reluctant to interfere with the decisions of such a body, and will do so
only when the actions and decisions of that body constitute an abuse of discretion.
It is further clear that a city or town may impose
reasonable costs or duties on landowners as a condition
of annexation under this statute. In the Beaver City
case, for example, the city council imposed certain conditions on annexation including installation of water
lines and preparation of certain portions of the property for paving. With respect to these conditions, the
court stated:
The actual authorization for the annexation was
made by the City Council, and there is no reason
that we know of why it was not proper ami, within
its prerogative to prescribe reasonable conditions
in connection with the annexation. 493 P.2d at 645
(emphasis added).
8
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In the instant case, the Spanish Fork City Council
has recognized and followed the statutory procedure for
annexation. In the property does not meet certain standards, or if the proponents of the annexation do not meet
or comply with the conditions previously imposed by the
city council, or if the proposed annexation will jeopardize city services for residents of the city, or if the
proposed annexation will be costly or burdensome for
the city, then the city council may refuse to complete
the annexation procedure until the incoming landowners
fulfill certain reasonable conditions thereof. Imposition
of such conditions is well within the council's legislative
prerogative under Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1 (1953) as interpreted by this court.
B. Utah Code Ann. §10-7-4(1953).
Appellants further argue, however, that the council's action contravenes Utah Code Ann. §10-7-4 (1953)
governing the acquisition of municipal water sources.
Appellants precise contention is that unless a city uses
the means of purchase, lease or condemnation as set
forth in this section to obtain water supplies, it commits
an ultra vires act.
Appellants' argument is erroneous for several reasons. The first is that Utah Code Ann. §10-7-4 is not
the only statute governing acquisition of water supplies
by municipalities as appellants suggest. (Brief of Appellants at 6.) The court's attention is directed to Utah
Code Ann. §10-8-18 (1953), for example, which also deals
directly with the acquisition of water sources by cities
and towns.
9
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More importantly, however, appellants' argument
simply ignores that part of the statute which expressly
empowers cities to use means other than purchase, lease,
or condemnation to obtain water supplies. The exact
statutory language is as follows:
The board of commissioners, city council or board
of trustees of any city or town may acquire, purchase or lease all or any part of any wrater, water
works system, water supply or property connected
therewith, and whenever the governing body of
a city or town shall deem it necessary for the
public good such city or town may bring condemnation proceedings to acquire the same; . . . Utah
Code Ann. §10-7-4 (1953) (emphasis added).
Utah Code Ann. §10-8-18 similarly provides:
[The boards of commissioners and city councils
of cities] may construct, purchase or lease and
maintain canals, ditches, artesian wells and reservoirs, may appropriate, purchase or lease
springs, stream or sources of water supply for
the purpose of providing water for irrigation,
domestic or other useful purposes; may prevent
all waste or water flowing from artesian wells,
^ and if necessary to secure sources of water supply, may purchase or lease land; they may also
purchase, acquire or lease stock in canal com, s panies for the purpose of providing water for the
city and the inhabitants thereof. (Emphasis
added.)
As is evident from the express statutory language
cited above, the legislature did not intend to limit municipalities to the means of purchase, lease or condemnation in obtaining water supplies. On the contrary, the
legal definition of the term "acquire" includes pur10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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chase, lease, condemnation, and much more. Indeed,
"acquire" is defined as "to gain by any [lawful] means
. . . or in whatever manner." Black's Law Dictionary
(rev. 4th ed. 1968) (emphasis added). Furthermore,
this broad view regarding the legitimate means of acquisition of municipal water sources was recognized in
Utah case law as early as 1891 and has been followed
to this day. City of Springville v. Fullmer f 7 Utah 450,
27 P. 577 (1891). Thus from a strictly legal viewpoint,
respondent city's chosen means of obtaining water supplies for the proposed annexation is legitimate under
both Utah Code Ann. §10-7-4 and Utah Code Ann.
§10-8-18.
Carrying appellants' argument to its logical conclusion also presents practical problems of great significance. By limiting municipalities to the means of purchase, lease, or condemnation only, appellants would necessarily foreclose all other means of obtaining water
supplies including gift, adverse possession, and prescriptive easement. Such a result would have a dramatic adverse effect on municipal powers which is not warranted
by the enabling statutes. Such a result would also contravene Utah precedent which has recognized the right
of a municipality to acquire water rights by adverse
possession. City of Springville, 27 P. at 577-78.
Finally, in attempting to establish their unrealistically limited theory of municipal powers, appellants have
failed to cite a single authority which is directly in point.
Thus Rithole v. City of Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 385, 384
P.2d 702 (1955); Lark v. Whitehead, 28 Utah 2d 343,
11
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502 P.2d 557 (1972); Sanchez v. City of Santa Fe, 82
N.M. 322, 481 P.2d 401 (1971); King v. Alaska State
Housing Authority, 512 P.2d 887 (Ala. 1973); Town of
Sheridan v. Valley Sanitation District, 137 Colo. 315,
324 P.2d 1038 (1958); State ex rel. Wisconsin Telephone
Co. v. City of Sheboygan, 111 Wis. 23, 86 N.W. 657
(1901); and Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 223 Wis. 251, 270 N.W. 336 (1936), are all readily
distinguishable on the grounds that none deals with a
city's power to annex contiguous territory or obtain
water supplies under the relevant Utah enabling statutes which must be applied in this case. Furthermore,
respondent city agrees with the general proposition for
which the cases are cited, namely that a city may not
exceed its delegated power to act under specific enabling
statutes. Rather than demonstrating how respondent
has exceeded its authority under the relevant Utah statutes, however, appellants have been content to rely upon
generalized statements of law applied to distinguishable
factual situations arising under irrelevant enabling statutes. In contrast, respondent has demonstrated how and
why it has not exceeded its delegated authority under
the applicable Utah statutes as applied to the facts of
this case.
Respondent respectfully submits that imposing a
condition for annexation which would require the transfer of needed irrigation water to the city is a legitimate
exercise of the city's power to acquire water sources
under Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1, §10-7-4, and §10-8-18 as
well as the Utah cases interpreting these statutes. The
lower court should therefore be affirmed on this point.
12
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POINT III
THE CONDITION REQUIRING A TRANSFER OF IRRIGATION WATER TO THE
CITY PRIOR TO ANNEXATION DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE A TAKING OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY WITHOUT COMPENSATION.
The issue raised in Point II of appellants' brief is
whether a condition requiring transfer of irrigation
water to respondent city prior to annexation constitutes
a taking of private property without compensation in
violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
Appellants cite several cases as authority for the
general proposition that government cannot seek to obtain compliance with an unconstitutional demand by
establishing that unconstitutional demand as a precondition to the exercise of discretionary power. See Frost
v. Railroad Commission, 271 U.S. 583 (1926); Bynum
v. Schiro, 219 F. Supp. 204 (E.D. La. 1963); State v.
Salt Lake City, 21 Utah 2d 318, 445 P.2d 691 (1968).
(Brief of Appellants at 11-12.) Respondent agrees. However, appellants fail to cite a single case in support of
their argument that a condition for annexation requiring transfer of water shares to the city amounts to an
unconstitutional taking. Instead, the only basis for appellants ' position is the unsupported conclusory statement that requiring the proponents of annexation to
transfer water shares or the money equivalent to the city
is "by definition" a "classical example of a taking of
private property rights by a government body." (Brief
of Appellants at 11.)
13
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Respondent submits that appellants' unsupported
conclusion is oversimplified and contrary to the law.
See e.g., 56 Am. Jur.2d Municipal Corporations §60
(1971); Annot., 64 A.L.R. 1335, 1360 (1929). As these
authorities indicate, the test to be applied to this question is essentially the same as applied in Beaver City,
i.e., whether the condition of annexation is reasonable.
And as Judge Ballif pointed out in applying this test,
the city's requirement is not a taking at all, but rather
a means of providing the additional resources necessary
to properly serve the Wolf Hollow area without forcing
a dilution of municipal services or an increased tax
burden on present city residents. (R. 11-12.) Such
grounds clearly fall short of the " arbitrary or capricious" standard required to justify intervention by the
courts. Furthermore, appellants do not even claim that
the amount of additional water required by the city
exceeds the area's needs. Since the required amount is
uncontested, it certainly seems reasonable for the city
to require the landowners in the area, presumably those
who stand to benefit most by an extension of municipal
services, to provide the needed resources before the city
becomes obligated to extend such services.
For the foregoing reasons, the lower court properly
ruled that the condition at issue does not constitute an
unconstitutional taking of private property without just
compensation.

14
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POINT IV
THE CONDITION REQUIRING A TRANSFER OF IRRIGATION WATER TO THE
CITY PRIOR TO ANNEXATION DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION.
The issue raised in Point III of appellants' brief is
essentially the same one raised in Point II, namely,
wrhether the required transfer of irrigation water to the
city as a precondition of annexation is reasonable. Appellants further assert, however, that the imposed condition creates an " inherent inequality among the plaintiffs, the minority owners within the territory to be
annexed, and the present inhabitants of the city" which
creates a denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Brief of
Appellants at 16.)
Because municipal corporations enjoy broad legislative powers, the courts will not invalidate a municipality's legislative acts unless the complaining party can
present substantial evidence that it has exceeded its
federal and state constitution limitations or abused its
discretion by acting in an arbitrary, discriminatory, capricious, or unreasonable manner. State ex rel. Holifield v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans, 108
So. 2d 277 (La. Ct. App.), cert, denied, 361 U.S. 817
(1959); 1 J. Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law §4.12,
at 206 (1968); 2 E. McQuillan, The Law of Municipal
Corporations §10.33, at 823-25 (3rd ed. rev. 1966); Comment, 1971 Utah L. Eev. 397. Where the plaintiffs allege that the municipality has exceeded its constitutional
limitations by denying the the equal protection of the
15
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

laws, the courts apply one of two established tests to
determine the validity of the municipality's act. See
Developments in the Law — Equal Protection, 82 Harv.
L. Rev. 1065 (1969). These tests are the "traditional"
or "classical" test and the "strict review" test. Since
it is uncontested that no suspect classification such as
race or fundamental interest such as voting is involved
in the instant case, the traditional test is the proper
standard to be applied. Under this test, the governmental classification is presumed to be reasonable unless
the complaining party shows it to be arbitrary. If, however, there is a rational connection between the classification and a proper governmental objective, the classification will be upheld. Raihvay Express Agency, Inc. v.
New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
A. Proponents vs. Dissenting Property Owners
Appellants attack two classifications allegedly imposed by the condition. The first is that which allegedly
differentiates between plaintiffs, proponents of annexation, and the dissenting, minority property owners.
(Brief of Appellants at 15.) Appellants' argument
seems to be that requiring the proponents of annexation to convey water shares for the entire area constitutes an arbitrary and capricious act. (Brief of Appellants at 14-16.)
Upon analysis, it becomes readily apparent that the
alleged discriminatory classification between majority
and minority property owners in the Wolf Hollow area
is without foundation in fact. The condition imposed in
this matter is simply the "transfer of irrigation water
16
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to the city" by the "owners of property" in the area.
(R. 51A; 54.) It is not the "transfer of irrigation water
to the city by the majority landowners only" as appellants seem to suggest. The city's only concern is that
the additional water is provided before annexation is
completed; it is not concerned with who provides it.
But even assuming arguendo that a "classification"
had been made, it seems evident that a rational basis
for this "classification" would exist. In the first place,
it is uncontroverted that the amount of water required
to be transferred to the city will be necessary to adequately service the entire Wolf Hollow area, Secondly,
since appellants are the majority landowners who petitioned for annexation in the first place, and who will
presumably stand to benefit most from subsequent development of the area, it seems obvious that they constitute the group most likely to fulfill the conditions
imposed. Thus the city's objective of acquiring adequate
water resources to service the entire annexation area
would most easily and most probably be achieved, at
the lowest cost, by imposing the condition on those most
interested in and most likely to benefit from the proposal. Such grounds fall far short of the arbitrary and
capricious standard required by the courts.
B. Proponents vs. City Residents
Appellants' second objectionable classification is
that which allegedly differentiates between the proponents of annexation and present city inhabitants.
(Brief of Appellants at 16.) There are, however, several rational bases which support this classification.
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In the first place, it is important to note the inherent distinction which always exists between city residents, already enjoying the benefits and bearing the
burdens of city living, and noncity residents attempting
to obtain an expansion of municipal services. Such an
expansion of city services necessarily results in additional costs which must be met either by requiring the
transfer of needed resources as a precondition of annexation, or by penalizing city residents by diluting
existing services or increasing their tax burden. In this
regard it is no answer to claim that the city could avoid
all financial burden on its inhabitants by simply issuing
bonds to pay for the water under Utah Code Ann. §10-7-7
through §10-7-10 (1953), since it ignores very real problems such as statutory debt ceilings, bond issue election
expense, sinking fund and interest expense, and the
substantial possibility that the electors would defeat
the bond issue proposal. Furthermore, as Judge Ballif
pointed out in his minute entry, to adopt appellants'
theory would make annexation a matter of right by
simply meeting the statutory petition requirement without consideration of the additional burden thereby imposed on existing residents. (E. 11-12.) Under appellants' view, however, Utah municipalities would be forced
to accept annexation petitions regardless of whatever
burden may be imposed on city residents to provide
water or other resources for the annexed territory. For
these reasons, it is evident that the city acted rationally,
indeed prudently, in requiring the landowners in the
area to provide needed water resources before completing annexation.
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CONCLUSION
The summary judgment entered by the lower court
in respondent's favor should be affirmed for the following reasons:
1. It is uncontroverted that no genuine issue of material fact exists between the parties.
2. The condition requiring a transfer of irrigation
water to the City of Spanish Fork prior to annexation
of the Wolf Hollow acreage is reasonable under the circumstances.
3. The condition requiring a transfer of irrigation
water to the city prior to annexation does not constitute:
a, an ultra vires act under the relevant Utah
enabling statutes;
b. a taking of private property without compensation ; or
c. a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Respectfully submitted,
W. Eugene Hansen
G. Richard Hill
HANSEN & ORTON
Beneficial Life Tower, Suite 2020
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent
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